How Will the Presence of Autonomous Vehicles Affect the Equilibrium
  State of Traffic Networks? by Mehr, Negar & Horowitz, Roberto
How Will the Presence of Autonomous Vehicles Affect the
Equilibrium State of Traffic Networks?
Negar Mehr and Roberto Horowitz∗
January 17, 2019
Abstract
It is known that connected and autonomous vehicles are capable of maintaining shorter head-
ways and distances when they form platoons of vehicles. Thus, such technologies can result in
increases in the capacities of traffic networks. Consequently, it is envisioned that their deployment
will boost the network mobility. In this paper, we verify the validity of this impact under selfish
routing behavior of drivers in traffic networks with mixed autonomy, i.e. traffic networks with
both regular and autonomous vehicles. We consider a nonatomic routing game on a network with
inelastic (fixed) demands for the set of network O/D pairs, and study how replacing a fraction
of regular vehicles by autonomous vehicles will affect the mobility of the network. Using the well
known US bureau of public roads (BPR) traffic delay models, we show that the resulting Wardrop
equilibrium is not necessarily unique even in its weak sense for networks with mixed autonomy.
We state the conditions under which the total network delay is guaranteed not to increase as a
result of autonomy increase. However, we show that when these conditions do not hold, counter
intuitive behaviors may occur: the total delay can grow by increasing the network autonomy. In
particular, we prove that for networks with a single O/D pair, if the road degrees of asymmetry are
homogeneous, the total delay is 1) unique, and 2) a nonincreasing continuous function of network
autonomy fraction. We show that for heterogeneous degrees of asymmetry, the total delay is not
unique, and it can further grow with autonomy increase. We demonstrate that similar behav-
iors may be observed in networks with multiple O/D pairs. We further bound such performance
degradations due to the introduction of autonomy in homogeneous networks.
Keywords: autonomous vehicles, Wardrop equilibrium, game theory, Braess’s paradox, rout-
ing games, traffic networks.
1 Introduction
Connected and autonomous vehicles technology have attracted significant attention as a result of their
potentials for increasing vehicular safety and drivers’ comfort. Connected technologies can be used to
inform drivers about the existing hazards through vehicle to vehicle (V2V) or vehicle to infrastructure
(V2I) communication. Aligned with these safety considerations, automobile companies have started to
equip vehicles with autonomous capabilities. In fact, some of these capabilities, such as driver assistive
technologies and adaptive cruise control (ACC) have already been deployed in vehicles.
The impact of these technologies is not limited to vehicles safety. Connected and autonomous
vehicles technology can facilitate vehicle platooning. Vehicle platoons are groups of more than one
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vehicle, capable of maintaining shorter headways; thus, platooning can lead to increases in the capac-
ities of network links [LPTV17]. Such increases can be up to three–fold [LPTV17] if all the vehicles
are autonomous and connected. In addition to mobility benefits, platooning can have sustainability
benefits, it can also reduce energy consumption for heavy duty vehicles [AAGJ10, LMJ13, ABT+15].
The mobility benefits of platooning and autonomous capabilities of vehicles are not limited to
increasing network capacities. There has been a focus on how to utilize vehicle autonomy and con-
nectedness to remove signal lights from intersections and coordinate conflicting movements such that
the network throughput is improved [ZMC16, TC15, MK14, FV18]. However, in order for such ap-
proaches to be implemented, all vehicles in the network need to have autonomous capabilities. To
reach the point where all vehicles are autonomous, transportation networks need to face a transient
era, when both regular and autonomous vehicles coexist in the networks. Therefore, it is crucial to
study networks with mixed autonomy.
In [AFKV16], the performance of traffic networks with mixed autonomy was studied via simula-
tions. Moreover, it was shown in multiple works that in networks with mixed autonomy, autonomous
vehicles can be utilized to stabilize the low–level dynamics of traffic networks and damp congestion
shockwaves [WKVB17, DR99, YH06, PvA10, SCDM+18]. In [MLH18b, MLH18a] altruistic lane choice
of autonomous vehicles was studied. In [LCP17a], the capacity of network links was modeled in a traffic
setting with mixed autonomy. This modeling framework was further used in [LCP17b] to calculate the
price of anarchy of traffic networks with mixed autonomy, where the price of anarchy is an indicator
of how far the equilibrium of networks with mixed autonomy is from their social optimum that could
have been achieved if a social planner had routed all the vehicles. In [LCPS18], it was shown that local
actions of the autonomous vehicles on the road can lead to optimal vehicle orderings for the global
network properties such as link capacities.
It is well known that due to the selfish route choice behavior of drivers, traffic networks normally
operate in an equilibrium state, where no vehicle can decrease its trip time by unilaterally changing
its route [Smi79]. In this paper, we wish to study how the introduction of autonomous vehicles in the
network will affect the equilibrium state of traffic networks compared to the case when all vehicles
are nonautonomous. We extend our initial results presented in [MH18]. In particular, given a fixed
demand of vehicles, we study how replacing a fraction of regular vehicles by autonomous vehicles will
affect the equilibrium state of traffic networks. We study the system behavior when both regular
and autonomous vehicles select their routes selfishly to investigate the necessity of centrally enforcing
autonomous vehicles routing by a network manager. We state the conditions under which increasing
network autonomy fraction is guaranteed to reduce the overall network delay. Moreover, we show that
when these conditions do not hold, counter intuitive and undesirable behaviors might occur, such as
the case when increasing the portion of autonomous vehicles in the network can increase the overall
network delay. Such behaviors are similar to Braess’ paradox, where the construction of a new road
or expanding link capacities may increase total network delay.
We model the network in a macroscopic framework where vehicle route choices are taken into
account. We model the selfish route choice behavior of the drivers as a nonatomic routing game [Rou02]
where drivers choose their routes selfishly until a Wardrop Equilibrium is achieved [War52]. We
represent a traffic network by a directed graph with a certain set of origin destination (O/D) pairs.
For each O/D pair, we consider two classes of vehicles, regular and autonomous. For a given fixed
demand profile along O/D pairs, we study how increasing the autonomy fraction of O/D pairs will
affect the total delay of the network at equilibrium.
We first show that the equilibrium may not be unique even in the weak sense of total link utilization.
Then, we study networks with a single O/D pair and prove that if the degrees of road capacity
asymmetry are homogeneous in the network, the social or total delay of the network is unique, and
further it is a monotone nonincreasing function of the network autonomy ratio. However, in networks
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with heterogeneous degrees of road asymmetry, we first show that the social delay is not unique. Then,
we demonstrate that, surprisingly, increasing the autonomy ratio of the network may lead to an increase
in the overall network delay. This is a counter intuitive behavior as we might expect that having more
autonomous vehicles in the network will always be beneficial in terms of total network delay. For the
networks with multiple O/D pairs, we show that similar complicated behaviors may occur, namely
increasing autonomy fraction of an O/D pair might worsen the social delay of the network. Our work
in fact shows that traffic paradoxes similar to the well known Braess’s Paradox [Bra68] can occur due to
capacity increases provided by autonomous vehicles. We further bound such performance degradations
that can arise from the presence of autonomous vehicles.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe our notation and model.
We review the prior relevant results in Section 3. Then, in Section 4, we study the uniqueness of
equilibrium in our routing setting. Next, in Section 5, we analyze mixed autonomy networks with a
single O/D pair in Section 5. Subsequently, we study mixed–autonomy networks with multiple O/D
pairs in Section 6. Finally, we conclude the paper and provide relevant future directions in Section 7.
2 Nonatomic Selfish Routing
We model a traffic network by a directed graph G = (N,L,W ), where N and L are respectively the
set of nodes and links in the network. Each link l ∈ L in the network is a pair of distinct nodes (v, w)
and represents a directed edge from v towards w. We assume that each link joins two distinct nodes;
thus, no self loops are allowed. Define W = {(o1, d1), (o2, d2), · · · , (ok, dk)} to be the set of origin
destination (O/D) vertex pairs of the network. A node n ∈ N can appear in multiple O/D pairs. In a
nonatomic selfish routing game, if each O/D pair has a fixed given nonzero demand, then it is called
a nonatomic selfish routing game with inelastic demands. Each O/D pair consists of infinitesimally
small agents where every agent decides on each path such that their own delay is minimized. The
delay of each path depends on how network paths are shared among different O/D pairs. For each
O/D pair w = (oi, di), 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we let Pw denote the set of all possible network paths from oi to di.
We assume that the network topology is such that for each O/D pair w ∈W , there exists at least one
path from its origin to its destination, i.e. Pw 6= ∅. We further let P = ∪w∈WPw denote the set of all
network paths.
For an O/D pair w ∈W , let rw be the given fixed demand of vehicles associated with w. Further-
more, for a path p ∈ Pw, let fp be the flow of the O/D pair w along path p. Note that each path
connects exactly one origin to one and only one destination; thereby, once a path is fixed, its origin and
destination are uniquely determined. Consequently, there is no need to explicitly include path O/D
pairs in the notation used for fp. It is important to note that in our setting, each O/D pair w has two
classes of vehicles: autonomous and regular. Consequently, for each w ∈ W , we define αw to be the
fraction of vehicles in rw that are autonomous. We let r = (rw : w ∈W ) and α = (αw : w ∈W ) be the
vectors of network demand and autonomy fraction respectively. Also, for each path p ∈ Pw, we use frp
and fap to respectively denote the flow of regular and autonomous vehicles along path p. Note that for
each path p ∈ P, we have fp = frp +fap . Moreover, for each O/D pair w ∈W , due to flow conservation,
we must have
∑
p∈Pw f
r
p = rw(1 − αw), and
∑
p∈Pw f
a
p = rwαw. The network flow vector f is a
nonnegative vector of regular and autonomous flows along network paths, i.e. f = (frp , f
a
p : p ∈ P). A
flow vector f is called feasible for a given network G, if for each w ∈W ,∑
p∈Pw
frp = (1− αw)rw, and
∑
p∈Pw
fap = αwrw, (1a)
frp ≥ 0, and fap ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ Pw. (1b)
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For each link l ∈ L, fl is the total flow of vehicles in link l, i.e. fl =
∑
p∈P:l∈p fp. Since we need
to decompose the total link flow into regular and autonomous vehicles, we let frl and f
a
l be the total
flow of regular and autonmous vehicles along link l respectively. In fact, frl and f
a
l are the summation
of the flow of regular and autonomous vehicles on all routes containing link l,
frl =
∑
p∈P:l∈p
frp , and f
a
l =
∑
p∈P:l∈p
fap .
Note that if all vehicles are regular for an O/D pair w ∈ W , i.e. αw = 0, then, we only have a
single class of regular vehicles along that O/D pair, and for each path p ∈ Pw, fp = frp . If for all
network O/D pairs w ∈ W , the autonomy fraction αw = 0; then, the same argument holds for link
flows, fl = f
r
l for all links l ∈ L. In fact, if all vehicles are regular, our routing game reduces to a
single class game
(∀w ∈W, αw = 0)⇐⇒
(∀p ∈ P, fp = frp ) . (2)
In order to be able to model the incurred delays when vehicles are routed throughout the network,
it is assumed that each link l ∈ L has a delay per unit of flow function el : R2 → R. We assume that
the delay per unit of flow for each path p ∈ P is obtained by the summation of the link delays over
the links that form p,
ep(f) =
∑
l∈L:l∈p
el(f
r
l , f
a
l ). (3)
Equation (3) implies that the delay of each path p ∈ P depends not only on the flows of regular and
autonomous vehicles along path p, but also on the flows along other paths. The overall network delay
or social delay is given by
J(f) =
∑
p∈P
fpep(f). (4)
2.1 Wardrop Equilibrium
It is well known in the transportation literature that if there are many noncooperative agents, namely,
flows that behave selfishly [Rou06], a network is at an equilibrium if the well known Wardrop condi-
tions hold [War52]. The Wardrop conditions state that at equilibrium, no user has any incentive for
unilaterally changing its path. This implies that for an equilibrium flow vector f , if there exists a path
p ∈ Pw such that either frp 6= 0 or fap 6= 0, we must have that ep(f) ≤ ep′(f), for all paths p′ ∈ Pw.
Definition 1. Given a network G = (N,L,W ), a flow vector f is a Wardrop equilibrium if and only
if for every O/D pair w ∈W and every p, p′ ∈ Pw
frp (ep(f)− ep′(f)) ≤ 0, (5a)
fap (ep(f)− ep′(f)) ≤ 0. (5b)
Note that an implication of the above definition is that for each O/D pair w ∈W , and any two paths
p, p′ ∈ Pw such that fp 6= 0 and fp′ 6= 0, we must have that ep(f) = ep′(f).
Definition 2. Given an equilibrium flow vector f for the network G = (N,L,W ), we define the delay
of travel for each O/D pair w ∈W to be
ew(f) := min
p∈Pw
ep(f). (6)
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Motivated by the above discussion, ew(f) is precisely the delay across all paths p ∈ Pw which have a
nonzero flow. Moreover, the equilibrium condition implies that for a path p ∈ Pw with zero flow, we
have ep(f) ≥ ew(f).
It is worth mentioning that when there are no autonomous vehicles, i.e. for all w ∈ W,αw = 0,
since frp = fp for all p ∈ P, Conditions (5) reduce to
fp (ep(f)− ep′(f)) ≤ 0, ∀w ∈W, ∀p, p′ ∈ Pw. (7)
2.2 Delay Characterization
We first specify the structure of our delay functions. If there is only a single class of regular vehicles
in the network, the US Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) [Man64] suggests the following form of delay
functions.
Assumption 1. When network links are shared by only regular vehicles, the link delay functions
el : R→ R are of the following form
el(fl) = al
(
1 + γl
(
fl
Cl
)βl)
, (8)
where Cl is the capacity of link l, and al, γl, and βl are nonnegative link parameters.
In practice, al is the free flow travel time on l, γl is normally 0.15, and βl is a positive integer ranging
from 1 to 4. In order to characterize the delay functions in networks with mixed autonomy, where we
have two classes of vehicles, we first need to model the impact of autonomous vehicles on link capacities.
In each network link l ∈ L, the link capacity Cl restricts the maximum possible flow of vehicles. It was
shown in [LCP17a] that in networks with mixed autonomy, Cl depends on the autonomy ratio of link l
defined as αl :=
fal
fal +f
r
l
. We use Cl(αl) to emphasize this dependence. Let ml and Ml be the capacity
of link l when all vehicles are regular and autonomous respectively. Since autonomous vehicles are
capable of maintaining shorter headways, it is normally the case that mlMl ≤ 1. When the two classes
of regular and autonomous vehicles are present in the network, using the results in [LCP17a], we have
Cl(αl) =
mlMl
αlml + (1− αl)Ml . (9)
We adopt this model throughout this paper to investigate the mobility impact of autonomous
vehicles on the network. Since for each link l ∈ L, αl = f
a
l
fal +f
r
l
and fl = f
a
l + f
r
l , using (9), for
networks with mixed autonomy, the delay function (8) can be modified as:
el(f
r
l , f
a
l ) = al
1 + γl
 frl + fal
mlMl(frl +f
a
l )
mlfal +Mlf
a
l
βl
 . (10)
= al
(
1 + γl
(
fal
Ml
+
frl
ml
)βl)
. (11)
Note that when only regular vehicles are present in the network, for each link l ∈ L since fl = frl ,
the link delay function reverts to
5
AB
C
D
1
3
2
4
Figure 1: A network with a single O/D pair and two paths.
el(fl) = al
(
1 + γl
(
frl
ml
)βl)
. (12)
3 Prior Work
3.1 Existence of Equilibrium
We state the following proposition from [BK79] which studies the conditions under which a Wardrop
Equilibrium exists for a multiclass traffic network.
Proposition 1. Given a network G = (N,L,W ), if the link delay functions are continuous and
monotone in the link flow of each class; then, there exists at least one Wardrop equilibrium.
Remark 1. Using (11), since our assumed delay functions are nonnegative, continuous, and monotone
in the flow of each class, Proposition 1 implies that there always exists at least one Wardrop equilibrium
for a routing game with mixed autonomy.
3.2 Uniqueness of Equilibrium
In this part, we review the known results regarding the uniqueness of the Wardrop Equilibrium. When
multiple classes of vehicles are present in the network, the uniqueness of the equilibrium flow vector
does not hold. However, uniqueness in a weak sense is known to hold from [ABEA+06].
Proposition 2. For a general topology network G with multiple classes of vehicles on each O/D pair,
if the delay functions are of the form (8), and the link capacities Cl are fixed and the same for all
vehicle classes, for a given demand vector r, we have
1. The equilibrium is unique in a weak sense, i.e. for each link l, the total flow fl for all Wardrop
equilibrium flow vectors f is unique.
2. For each O/D pair w ∈ W , the delay of travel ew(f) is unique for all Wardrop equilibrium flow
vectors f . Thus, the delay of travel for each O/D pair in equilibrium, i.e. ew(f), only depends on
the network demand vector r. Hence, we may unambiguously define ew(r) to denote this unique
value.
Remark 2. Note that a routing game that has only a single class of vehicles can be viewed as an
instance of the games described in Proposition 2. Therefore, uniqueness in a the weak sense applies to
games with a single class of vehicles too.
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3.3 Monotonicity of Social Delay
As we discussed above, in general, the equilibrium is not unique. However, if the conditions of Propo-
sition 2 hold for a network, the social delay and the delay of travel for each O/D pair are unique. For
a single class routing game on G = (N,L,W ), recall the following from [Hal78].
Proposition 3. Consider a network G = (N,L,W ), where only one class of vehicles exists for each
O/D pair w ∈ W . Assume that for each link l ∈ L, el(.) is continuous, positive valued, and mono-
tonically increasing. Then, for each w ∈ W , the delay of travel ew(r) is a continuous function of the
demand vector r. Furthermore, ew(.) is nonincreasing in rw when all other demands rw′ , w
′ 6= w, are
fixed.
4 Uniqueness in the Mixed-Autonomy Setting
Now we study equilibrium uniqueness in our setting. Using Remark 1, we know that there exists at
least one equilibrium. However, since in our setting, for each link l, Cl depends on the autonomy ratio
αl, Proposition 2 does not apply. Indeed, we demonstrate through an example that the equilibrium is
not unique even in the weak sense introduced in Proposition 2.
Example 1. Consider the network of Figure 1. Let p1 and p2 be the ABD and ACD paths respectively.
For each link l = 1, · · · , 4, let the link parameters be βl = 1, al = 1,ml = 1, and ,Ml = 2. Thus, for
each link l ∈ L, the link delay function is el = 1 + frl +
fal
2
. Assume that the demand from node A to
D is r = 2, and α = 0.5. The example is simple enough so that we can compute the equilibrium flows
manually. Let fr1 and f
a
1 be the regular and autonomous vehicles flows along p1, and f
r
2 and f
a
2 be the
regular and autonomous flows along p2. At equilibrium, using the symmetry of the network, we must
have
2 + 2fr1 + f
a
1 = 2 + 2f
r
2 + f
a
2
fr1 + f
r
2 = 1
fa1 + f
a
2 = 1
fr1 , f
a
1 , f
r
2 , f
a
2 ≥ 0.
Clearly, there is no unique solution to the above set of equations. Moreover, among the set of all
possible equilibrium flow vectors, for each link, the maximum link flow at equilibrium is 1.25, whereas
the minimum link flow is 0.75 at equilibrium. This implies that equilibrium uniqueness does not hold
even in the weak sense for traffic networks with mixed autonomy.
5 Networks with a Single O/D Pair
In this section, we study two terminal networks which have a single O/D pair in the presence of
autonomy. For such networks, since there is only one O/D pair, all paths originate from a common
source o and end in a common destination d. Since W is singleton, we omit the subscript w from rw,
ew and αw throughout this section. Note that when the network has a single O/D pair, r and α are
scalars.
Having observed that in the mixed-autonomy setting, the equilibrium is not unique even in the
weak sense, it is important to study if the social delay is unique for all network equilibrium flow vectors.
To this end, in the following, we study the properties of the social delay including its uniqueness. To
this end, we need to define the notion of road degree of capacity asymmetry introduced in [LCP17b].
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Figure 2: A network with a single O/D pair and three paths from A to D.
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Figure 3: Maximum and minimum social delay for Example 2.
Given a network G = (N,L,W ), for each link l ∈ L, we define µl := ml/Ml to be the degree of capacity
asymmetry of link l. Note that since we assumed that autonomous vehicles headway is less than or
equal to that of regular vehicles, for each link l ∈ L, µl ≤ 1. In the sequel, we consider two scenarios
for investigating the properties of social delay:
1. Homogeneous degrees of road capacity asymmetry, where µl is the same for all links, i.e. µl = µ,
for all links l ∈ L, where µ is the common value of capacity asymmetry.
2. Heterogeneous degrees of capacity asymmetry, where µl varies on different links.
5.1 Homogeneous Degrees of Capacity Asymmetry
In this case, we can establish the uniqueness of the social delay, and characterize the relationship
between social delay and network autonomy ratio.
Theorem 1. Given a network G = (N,L,W ) with a single O/D pair and a homogeneous degree of
capacity asymmetry µ, for any demand vector r > 0, we have:
1. For a fixed autonomy ratio 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the social delay J(f) is unique for all Wardrop equilibrium
flow vectors f .
2. If for each 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, we denote the common value of social delay in the above by J(α), then
J(.) is continuous and nonincreasing.
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Proof. Fix r > 0 and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Recalling Remark 1, we know that a Wardrop equilibrium exists.
Let f = (frp , f
a
p : p ∈ P) be such an equilibrium flow vector where fp = fap + frp for each path p in P.
Define emin(f) := minp∈P ep(f). Since the network has only one O/D pair, and the delay associated
with all paths with nonzero flows are the same, denoting this uniform path delay by emin(f), we realize
that the social delay is given by J(f) = remin(f). For each path p ∈ P, define the fictitious single-class
regular flow f˜p := f
r
p + µf
a
p . We claim that the flow vector f˜ = (f˜p : p ∈ P) is a Wardrop equilibrium
for a routing game on G with a single class of regular vehicles and a total demand of r˜ = r(1−α)+rαµ
with the delay function (e˜l : l ∈ L) defined as
e˜l(f˜l) = al
1 + γl( f˜l
ml
)βl .
To see this, for each p ∈ P, we show that relations (7) hold. Fix p, p′ ∈ P and note that since f was a
Wardrop equilibrium in the original setting, we have frp (ep(f)−ep′(f)) ≤ 0, and fap (ep(f)−ep′(f)) ≤ 0.
Multiplying the latter by the positive constant µ and adding the two inequalities, we have
f˜p(ep(f)− ep′(f)) ≤ 0, ∀p, p′ ∈ P. (13)
Now, we claim that for all p ∈ P, we have ep(f) = e˜p(f˜). Note that for each link l ∈ L, we have
f˜l = f
r
l + µf
a
l . Using the fact that µ = ml/Ml for all l ∈ L, we get
e˜p(f˜) =
∑
l∈p
al
(
1 + γl
(
frl +
ml
Ml
fal
ml
)βl)
=
∑
l∈p
al
(
1 + γl
(
frl
ml
+
fal
Ml
)βl)
= ep(f).
(14)
Substituting into (13), we realize that
f˜p(e˜p(f˜)− e˜p′(f˜)) ≤ 0, ∀p, p′ ∈ P, (15)
which means that f˜ is an equilibrium flow vector. Clearly, the total demand of this new routing game
is r˜ =
∑
p∈P f˜p =
∑
p∈P f
r
p + µf
a
p = (1− α)r + µαr. Moreover, define e˜min(f˜) to be the minimum of
e˜p(f˜) among p ∈ P. Since w is the single O/D pair of the network, e˜min(f˜) is indeed equal to e˜w(f˜),
the travel delay of the single O/D pair of the network associated with f˜ . Note that Proposition 2
implies that e˜min(f˜) is a function of r˜ only. On the other hand, (14) implies that e˜min(f˜) = emin(f).
Putting these together, we realize that
J(f) = remin(f) = re˜min(f˜) = re˜w(r˜).
Note that the right hand side of the above identity does not depend on f , which establishes the proof
of the first part. In fact, this shows that
J(α) = re˜w(r(1− α) + αµr).
From Proposition 3, we know that e˜w(.) is continuous and nonincreasing. Also, since µ ≤ 1, the map
r 7→ r(1−α)+αµr is continuous and nonincreasing. This completest the proof of the second part.
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Figure 4: Maximum and minimum social delays for the Example 4.
5.2 Heterogeneous Degrees of Capacity Asymmetry
Now, we allow µl to vary among the network links. We show that this makes the behavior of the
system more complex. First, we show via the following example that the social delay is not necessarily
unique in this case.
Example 2. Consider the network shown in Figure 2. Assume that γl = 1, βl = 1, for l = 1, 2, · · · , 5.
Let the other link parameters be the following: {a1 = 1,m1 = 1,M1 = 1}, {a2 = 2,m2 = 1,M2 = 3},
{a3 = 1,m3 = 1,M3 = 2}, {a4 = 1,m4 = 1,M4 = 4}, and {a5 = 3,m5 = 1,M5 = 3}. Moreover,
let the total flow from origin A to destination D be 2. Now, if we compute the social delay for this
network for any α > 0 at the different equilibria of the system, we observe that the social delay is
not unique. In particular, Figure 3 shows the plots of the maximum and minimum social delay of the
system at equilibrium for every value of α. As Figure 3 shows, as soon as α starts to increase from
0, uniqueness of social delay is lost. Once, α = 1, the uniqueness of social delay is again preserved.
This behavior implies that the change in the social delay due to increasing the autonomy ratio of the
network is dependent on which equilibrium the system will be at.
Now, we study the effect of increasing network autonomy on the social delay. In the previous
example, both the maximum and minimum social delays decreased as a function of α. But, is this
necessarily the case? We use the following examples to demonstrate that it may not be true in general,
as increasing network autonomy may increase social delay in some networks.
Example 3. Consider the network of Figure 2. Let γl = 1 and βl = 1 for all links. Select the other
network parameters to be the following, {a1 = 0,m1 = 0.1,M1 = 0.1}, {a2 = 50,m2 = 1,M2 = 1},
{a3 = 50,m3 = 1,M3 = 1}, {a4 = 0,m4 = 0.1,M4 = 0.1}, {a5 = 10,m5 = 0.5,M5 = 1}. Let the
total O/D demand be r = 6. In the absence of autonomy (α = 0), the social delay is J = 504.3.
However, if we increase the autonomy ratio to α = 110 , J = 518.6. Clearly, in this case, the social delay
increases when the network autonomy ratio α is increased. Note that since µl = 1 for l = 1, 2, 3, 4
and µ5 = 0.5 < 1, this can be viewed as an instance of the classical Braess’s Paradox [Bra68], where
an increase in the capacity of the middle link of a Wheatstone network can paradoxically lead to an
increase in the social delay.
One might argue that if we allow µl to be strictly less than 1 for all network links l ∈ L, the network
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social delay will decrease. We use the following example to show that even in this case, increasing
autonomy can worsen social delay.
Example 4. Consider the previous example with the total flow r = 6, but change Ml’s to be, M1 =
1
9 , M2 = 1.1, M3 = 1.1, M4 =
1
9 , and M5 = 1. In this case, clearly, µl < 1, for all l ∈ L. We
computed the maximum and minimum social delay at equilibrium for every autonomy fraction α.
Figure 4 shows the maximum and minimum social delay in this example for different values of α.
Figure 4 demonstrates that the maximum social delay increases as we increase α from 0, until we
reach a local maximum. The minimum social delay decreases as we increase α from 0, until we reach a
local minimum, and then, it increases sharply to values that are higher than the social delay at α = 0.
Surprisingly, when all vehicles are autonomous (α = 1) the social delay is greater than the social delay
when α = 0, i.e. J(α = 1) > J(α = 0). This might be counter intuitive as we expect the network
with full autonomy to have smaller social delay. However, this example shows that when capacity
increases are heterogeneous across the network, the selfish behavior of the vehicles when making their
route choices might actually lead to worsening the social delay of the network. Therefore, the mobility
benefits obtained from the introduction of autonomous vehicles in the network, in terms of decreasing
network social delay, are not obvious.
As mentioned previously, the increase in social delay due to an increase in the fraction of au-
tonomous vehicles is in fact a particular instance of Braess’s paradox. Braess’s Paradox is the coun-
terintuitive but well known fact that removing edges from a network or increasing the delay func-
tions on certain links can improve social delay [Rou06]. In our problem setting, replacing a fraction
of regular vehicles by autonomous vehicles can be interpreted as replacing the link delay function
al
(
1 + γl
(
fal
ml
+
frl
ml
)βl)
by al
(
1 + γl
(
fal
Ml
+
frl
ml
)βl)
for every link l ∈ L. It was shown in previous
studies that Braess paradox is prevalent and can be arbitrarily severe [SZ83, Rou06]. Despite the price
of anarchy, the occurence of Braess’s paradox heavily depends on network topology and the parameters
of link delay functions [Rou01, HA01, Mil03].
6 Networks with Multiple O/D Pairs
So far, we have seen that even in a network with only one O/D pair, the introduction of autonomous
vehicles can result in complex behaviors. Thus, it should be expected that a general network with
multiple O/D pairs will exhibit similar counter intuitive behaviors. In the previous section, we saw
that the existence of a homogeneous degree of capacity asymmetry throughout the network is sufficient
for guaranteeing improvements in the social delay by increasing the fraction of autonomous vehicles.
We now show, via the following example, that this is not the case for networks with multiple O/D
pairs.
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Example 5. Consider the network shown in Figure 5 which was first introduced in [Fis79]. There
are three O/D pairs, W = {(A,B), (B,C), (A,C)}. The total demand of the network O/D pairs are
rAB = 17, rAC = 20, and rBC = 90. Assume that γl = 1, βl = 1, for all links l ∈ L. Let the link
parameters be {a1 = 0,m1 = 1, ,M1 = 4}, {a2 = 0,m2 = 1}, and {a3 = 90,m3 = 1}. Let the vehicles
that travel from A to C, and from B to C be all regular vehicles, i.e. αAC = αBC = 0. Figure 6
shows a plot of the network social delay versus the fraction of autonomous vehicles traveling along
O/D pair AB, αAB. As the figure shows, as vehicle autonomy increases, so does the social delay. Note
that the social delay is unique in this case. This example shows that existence of vehicle autonomy
along certain network O/D pairs can result in worsening the overall or social delay of the network
even if the road degrees of capacity asymmetry are homogeneous. This is of paramount importance in
practice. For instance, if O/D pair AB belongs to a high–income neighborhood, autonomous vehicles
may first be deployed along this path, while other neighborhood or O/D pairs may still travel via
regular vehicles. Then, although the early adoption of autonomous vehicles along O/D pair AB will
lead to a decrease in travel delay of O/D pair AB, it worsens the social delay in the network and
increases the delays experienced by users along other O/D pairs. This example shows that even with
homogeneous degrees of capacity asymmetry, when there exist multiple O/D pairs, different autonomy
fractions along network O/D pairs can be another source of heterogeneity in the network; hence,
counterintuitive behaviors might occur for networks with mixed autonomy.
It was shown in [Fis79, DN84] that a decrease in the total demand of a single O/D pair, might
lead to an increase in delay of travel along other network O/D pairs and the social delay. In the
previous example, we showed that a similar behavior can also be observed due to the presence of
autonomous vehicles. In fact, what we have shown so far is that the long known paradoxical traffic
behavior resulting from constructing more roads or reducing demands can actually happen in networks
with mixed autonomy due to the presence of autonomous vehicles. Thus, the mobility benefits of
increasing autonomy in a network are not immediate, and in order to take advantage of the full mobility
potential of autonomous vehicles, control and routing strategies that guarantee mobility benefits must
be developed for the next generation of traffic networks.
Now that we have shown, the social delay can increase as a consequence of the presence of au-
tonomous vehicles in networks with multiple O/D pairs, we wish to study whether we can bound this
degradation in the network performance, to see how much worse the social delay can get with increasing
the fraction of autonomous vehicles. To answer this, we derive a bound on the performance degradation
that can result from all possible demand and autonomy fraction vectors in general networks that have
a homogeneous degree of capacity asymmetry. To this end, for a given network G and a demand vector
r, define the vector of fictitious reduced demand r˜ = (r˜w : w ∈W ) to be r˜w = (1−αw)rw +µαwrw for
each O/D pair w ∈ W . Consider an auxiliary fictitious routing game with a total demand r˜ of only
regular vehicles on G. For this auxiliary game, similar to Theorem 1, define (e˜l : l ∈ L) to be
e˜l = al
1 + γl( f˜l
ml
)βl , (16)
and let e˜w(r˜) be the delay of travel for each w ∈ W in this auxiliary game. Then, using the auxiliary
fictitious game, we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Consider a general network G = (N,L,W ) with a homogeneous degree of capacity
asymmetry µ ≤ 1 in all of its links. For any demand vector r, fix the vector of autonomy fraction
α = (αw : w ∈W ) such that 0 ≤ αw ≤ 1 for all w ∈W . Then, we have
1. The social delay J(f) is unique for all Wardrop equilibrium flow vectors f .
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Figure 6: Social delay in Example 5 for different fraction of autonomous vehicles traveling along O/D
pair AB when vehicles along all other O/D pairs are regular.
2. The social delay of the original game is J(f) =
∑
w∈W rwe˜w(r˜w) for all Wardrop equilibrium
flow vectors f .
Proof. Fix r and α, such that for each w ∈W , 0 < rw and 0 ≤ αw ≤ 1. Recalling Lemma 1, we know
that there exists at least one equilibrium. Let f = (frp , f
a
p : p ∈ P) be such an equilibrium flow vector
for G. For each path p ∈ P, define f˜p := frp + µfap . By generalizing the proof of Theorem 1, it is
easy to see that f˜ = (f˜p : p ∈ P) is an equilibrium for the defined auxiliary routing game on G with
reduced demand r˜ of only regular vehicles. Moreover, for each path p ∈ P, ep(f) = e˜p(f˜). Therefore,
for each O/D pair w ∈W , e˜w(f˜) = minp∈Pw e˜p(f˜) = minp∈Pw ep(f) = ew(f). Hence,
J(f) =
∑
w∈W
rwew(f) =
∑
w∈W
rwe˜w(f˜). (17)
Since f˜ contains only regular vehicles, recalling Remark 2 and Proposition 2, for each w ∈W , the
delay of travel e˜w(f˜) is unique for a given r˜; thus,
J(f) =
∑
w∈W
rwe˜w(r˜). (18)
As r˜ is uniquely determined for a given demand vector r and a vector of autonomy fraction α, the
social delay J(f) is unique for all Wardrop equilibrium flow vectors f and can be obtained via (18).
The uniqueness of social delay established by Proposition 4 implies that for a fixed demand vector
r, the social delay is a well defined function of autonomy fraction α. With a slight abuse of notation, we
use J(α) to emphasize the dependence of the social delay on the vector of autonomy fraction α. Note
that Proposition 4 establishes a connection between our original routing game, which has two classes
of vehicles, with a fictitious auxiliary routing game, which has only regular vehicles and a reduced
demand vector r˜. We exploit this connection in the remainder of the paper. Since the auxiliary game
has only one class of vehicles, the results in [CSSM08] hold for this game. Before proceeding, we need
to adopt and review some of the definitions in [CSSM08] for our proposed auxiliary game.
13
In the auxiliary game, for a given O/D demand vector r˜, a flow vector f˜ is feasible if f˜p ≥ 0 for
all paths p ∈ P, and ∑p∈Pw f˜p = r˜w for all w ∈ W . Let φ ∈ R|L| be a vector of link flows that result
from a feasible flow vector f˜ , where |L| is the number of links in the network. Also, let Φ represent
the set of all feasible link flow vectors φ for a given reduced demand vector r˜. Then, for a vector of
link delay functions (e˜l : l ∈ L) of the form (16) and any vector v ∈ Φ, define
λ
(
(e˜l : l ∈ L), v
)
:= max
x∈R|L|≥0
∑
l∈L
(
e˜l(vl)− e˜l(xl)
)
xl∑
l∈L e˜l(vl)vl
, (19)
where 0/0 is considered to be 0. Additionally, let E be the class of delay functions represented by (16).
Define
λ(E) := sup
(e˜l:l∈L)∈E,v∈Φ
λ ((e˜l : l ∈ L), v) . (20)
It is important to mention that since the class of delay functions E is monotone, λ(E) ≤ 1 in our
setting (See Section 4 in [CSSM08]). Note that λ(E) can be easily computed for certain classes of
delay functions such as polynomials. For instance, λ(E) = 14 for the class of linear delay functions.
Now, we can bound the network performance degradation due to the introduction of autonomy in
homogeneous networks via the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Consider a general network G = (N,L,W ) with a homogeneous degree of capacity
asymmetry µ. Fix the demand vector r. Let Jo be the social delay when all vehicles are nonautonomous,
i.e. αw = 0 for all w ∈ W . Then, for any other vector of autonomy fraction α such that 0 ≤ αw ≤ 1
for all w ∈W , we have
J(α) ≤ (1− λ(E))−1Jo, (21)
where J(α) is the social delay for the vector of autonomy fraction α. Note that using Proposition 4,
J(α) and Jo are unique, and; thus, well defined.
Proof. Fix the demand vector r. Let fo = (fop : p ∈ P) be an equilibrium flow vector when all vehicles
are regular. We further use fol to denote the flow along link l ∈ L in this case. Note that using
Proposition 2 , we know that fol is unique for every link l ∈ L. Moreover, for each path p ∈ P , we use
eop to represent the delay along path p when all vehicles are regular. Using Remark 2 and Proposition 2,
in the absence of autonomy, the delay of travel for each O/D pair w ∈W is unique. Thus, in this case,
the unique social delay Jo =
∑
w∈W rwe
o
w(r) , where e
o
w(r) is the delay of travel along w ∈ W when
all vehicles are regular.
On the other hand, when there are autonomous vehicles with a given autonomy fraction α in the
network, as defined in Proposition 4, construct the auxiliary game on G with fictitious reduced demand
r˜ = (r˜w : w ∈ W ) of only regular vehicles, where r˜w = (1 − αw)rw + µrwαw for every w ∈ W . Let
f˜ = (f˜p : p ∈ P) be an equilibrium flow vector for this auxiliary game. Using Proposition 4, the social
delay of the network with autonomous vehicles is given by J(α) =
∑
w∈W rwe˜w(r˜). First, we claim
that
J(α) =
∑
w∈W
rwe˜w(r˜) ≤
∑
l∈L
fol e˜l(r˜). (22)
To see this, note that for every link l ∈ L, we have fol =
∑
p∈P:l∈p f
o
p . Furthermore, the origin and
destination of each path p ∈ P are unique. Hence, each path p belongs to one and exactly one O/D
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pair w ∈W . Consequently, fol =
∑
w∈W
∑
p∈Pw:l∈p f
o
p , and we have
∑
l∈L
fol e˜l(r˜) =
∑
l∈L
∑
w∈W
∑
p∈Pw:l∈p
fop
 e˜l(r˜)
=
∑
w∈W
∑
l∈L
 ∑
p∈Pw:l∈p
fop
 e˜l(r˜)
=
∑
w∈W
∑
p∈Pw
fop
∑
l:l∈p
e˜l(r˜)
=
∑
w∈W
∑
p∈Pw
fop e˜p(r˜),
where e˜p(r˜) is the delay of path p ∈ Pw for the auxiliary game. Recalling Definition (6), for the
auxiliary game, the travel delay of an O/D pair w ∈ W is given by e˜w(r˜) = minp∈Pw e˜p(r˜); thus, we
have ∑
w∈W
∑
p∈Pw
fop e˜p(r˜) ≥
∑
w∈W
∑
p∈Pw
fop e˜w(r˜)
=
∑
w∈W
e˜w(r˜)
∑
p∈Pw
fop
=
∑
w∈W
rwe˜w(r˜),
which proves our claim in (22). Now, since the auxiliary game has only one class of vehicles, we can
use Lemma 4.1 from [CSSM08]. More precisely, since f˜ is an equilibrium for the auxiliary game, then
Lemma 4.1 from [CSSM08] states that for every nonnegative vector of link flows x ∈ R|L|≥0 (x is not
necessarily a feasible link flow vector), we have∑
l∈L
xle˜l(f˜l) ≤
∑
l∈L
xle˜l(xl) + λ(E)
∑
l∈L
f˜le˜l(f˜l). (23)
Since fol is nonnegative for every link l ∈ L, substituting xl by fol in (23), we get∑
l∈L
fol e˜l(f˜l) ≤
∑
l∈L
fol e˜l(f
o
l ) + λ(E)
∑
l∈L
f˜le˜l(r˜). (24)
Now, note that since both the auxiliary game and the game with no autonomy have only regular
vehicles, utilizing (16), we realize that
e˜l(f
o
l ) = al
(
1 + γl
(
fol
ml
)βl)
= eol (f
o
l ).
Thus, ∑
l∈L
fol e˜l(f
o
l ) =
∑
l∈L
fol e
o
l (f
o
l ) = J
o. (25)
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Now, since J(α) =
∑
w∈W rwe˜w(r˜) and for all links l ∈ L, e˜l(r˜) = e˜l(f˜l) by definition, using (22), (24),
and (25), we realize that
J(α) ≤ Jo + λ(E)
∑
l∈L
f˜le˜l(r˜). (26)
As f˜ is an equilibrium for the auxiliary routing game,
∑
l∈L f˜le˜l(r˜) =
∑
w∈W r˜we˜w(r˜). Since for each
O/D pair w ∈W , αw ≤ 1, we have r˜w ≤ rw. Therefore, using Proposition 4,∑
w∈W
r˜we˜w(r˜) ≤
∑
w∈W
rwe˜w(r˜) = J(α). (27)
Using (27) and (26), we get
J(α) ≤ Jo + λ(E)J(α). (28)
Hence, for the our monotone class of delay functions E with λ(E) < 1, we can conclude that
J(α) ≤ (1− λ(E))−1Jo,
which completes the proof.
Theorem 2 provides an upper bound on the severity of increases in traffic delays when a fraction
of regular vehicles is replaced by autonomous vehicles.
We now postulate, as an analogous concept to the price of anarchy [RT02], the price of vehicle
autonomy in homogeneous networks under every demand vector r as follows:
η := max
α: 0≤αw≤1, ∀w
J(α)
Jo
, (29)
Theorem 2 states that η ≤ (1 − λ(E))−1. For polynomial delay functions of degree less than or
equal to 4, (1−λ(E))−1 = 2.151 [CSSM08]. Interestingly, the bound that we have derived for the price
of vehicle autonomy is similar to the bounds derived for the price of anarchy of routing games with
a single class of users in [RT02, CSSM08]. Note that this bound for η is different from the price of
anarchy of routing games with mixed autonomy [LCP17b], it is similar to that of routing games with
only a single class of vehicles. However, unlike the bounds for price of anarchy, the tightness of our
bound for η must be further investigated.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we studied how the coexistence of autonomous and regular vehicles in traffic networks
will affect network mobility when all vehicles select their routes selfishly. We compared the total social
network delay at a Wardrop equilibrium in networks with mixed autonomy with that of the networks
with only regular vehicles. Having shown that the equilibrium is not unique in the mixed–autonomy
setting, we proved that the total social delay is unique when the road degree of capacity asymmetry,
which is the ratio between the roadway capacity with only regular vehicles and the roadway capacity
with only autonomous vehicles, is homogeneous among its roadway. We further proved that the total
social delay is a nonincreasing and continuous function of the fraction of autonomous vehicles on the
roadways (aka the autonomy ratio α) when the network has only one O/D pair. However, we showed
that allowing for heterogeneous degrees of capacity asymmetry or multiple O/D pairs in the network
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results in counter intuitive behaviors such as the fact that increasing network autonomy ratio can
worsen the network total social delay. Finally, we derived an upper bound for the “price of vehicles
autonomy” in networks with a homogeneous degree of capacity asymmetry, which estimates the worst
possible increase in network social delay, due to the introduction of autonomous vehicles.
We believe that the results presented in this paper indicate that the expected mobility benefits
resulting from wide spread utilization of autonomous vehicles in traffic networks are not immediate.
Thus, in order to take advantage of the potential mobility benefits of autonomy, it will be necessary
to study the stability of traffic equilibria in networks with mixed autonomy. Once the stable system
equilibria are characterized, traffic management and control strategies must be developed for the traffic
network that are guaranteed to steer the system to the equilibria that have lower total delay. Therefore,
revisiting routing and tolling strategies for networks with mixed vehicle autonomy is essential.
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